Army G-2 Assesses Germany Victory (6 OCT 1939)
Although the G-2 staff recognized that “detailed information of the campaign will be unavailable for some time,” it believed official communiques, prewar knowledge of German and Polish force organization, and analysis of events provided enough information to draw some conclusions from the campaign. The operationally focused report assessed force structure, mobilization, command, air operations, mechanized warfare, and strategic decision-making. Excellent maps supported the reconstruction of the eventual German victory.
The report noted Poland’s unfavorable geographical and strategic situation: Germany could strike from East Prussia to the north, from the German border in the west, and from Slovakia in the south. This geography enabled, the report stated, a “classic Schlieffen double envelopment” with the objective of “the complete destruction of the Polish Army.” Poland weakened its position by concentrating its armies far forward, near the frontiers. The strongest Polish army remained in west-central Poland while German armies already overlapped it from north and south. Unfortunately, the Polish Army had few mechanized units and little motor transport and depended on “the smooth and undisturbed operation of . . . railroads” for supply and repositioning.
Germany, by contrast, concentrated strong flanking armies while leaving its center comparatively weak. The southern army group made the main effort from Silesia and Slovakia, while the northern group advanced from Pomerania and East Prussia. “The German strategical plan,” the report noted, “was sound in all respects.” The plan focused on destroying the Polish field forces rather than pursuing symbolic objectives. Germany “paid no attention to unessential prestige objectives, such as Gdynia or Warsaw,” but emphasized “speed of movement and wide envelopments.”
The report’s narrative emphasized how rapidly the German plan turned into operational success. German forces pushed into Poland, made crossings of the Vistula, and trapped substantial Polish forces. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe worked to gain “domination of the air” through attacks on Polish air formations and airfields. Once Polish air resistance became “minimal, spasmodic, and ineffectual,” German aircraft concentrated on the railways. The report called this effort more important than direct tactical air support because it “paralyze[d] the entire Polish railroad net” in western Poland, preventing the movement of forces needed to oppose the German advance.
The decisive phase came after German infantry created gaps and caused Polish withdrawals. Initially, the advance looked largely like “an open warfare advance of the World War type,” with infantry moving forward at 8 to 10 miles daily. Then mechanized units were committed, and Panzer forces pushed south and east with “extreme rapidity,” driving a wedge between Polish armies west of the Vistula and those farther east. Other mechanized formations trapped Polish troops in central Poland, while German infantry units followed to complete encirclements and secure the prisoners.
Polish operational mistakes were “so striking as to nullify, in part at least,” the report stated, “the effect produced by the excellent strategy of German General Headquarters and the battle efficiency of the German Army and Air Force as a whole.” Even Polish courage could not repair the consequences of disastrous deployment of forces. The report concluded that Germany’s air forces and Panzer formations made a Polish defeat exceptionally quick, but “even if Germany had had but an equal air force and had possessed no mechanized divisions,” Polish encirclement and defeat would eventually have occurred.
In the end, the report considered Germany’s two modern weapons—air power and mechanization—as the factors that made the defeat rapid and decisive. Air forces neutralized Polish aviation and wrecked rail communications, while armored formations exploited openings, prevented orderly withdrawals, and made rearward defensive lines untenable before Polish forces could occupy them. The American Army’s first assessment of the Polish campaign argued that a modern force, effectively commanded and equipped with coordinated air and mechanized power, could defeat an army still structured along World War I lines with extraordinary speed.
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Article by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian. New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request previous articles, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
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